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  The direct sale of emission allowances by auction is an emerging characteristic of cap-and-
trade programs. This study is motivated by the observation that all of the major implementa-
tions of cap-and-trade regulations for the control of air pollution have started with a generous 
allocation of allowances relative to recent emissions history, a situation we refer to as a “loose 
cap.” Typically more stringent reductions are achieved in subsequent years of a program. We 
use an experimental setting to investigate the effects of a loose cap environment on a variety 
of auction types. We find that all auction formats studied are efficient in allocating emission 
allowances, but auction revenues tend to be lower relative to competitive benchmarks when 
the cap is loose. Regardless of whether the cap is tight or loose, the different auction formats 
tend to yield comparable revenues toward the end of a series of auctions. However, aggressive 
bidding behavior in initial discriminatory auctions yields higher revenues than in the other 
auction formats, a difference that disappears as bidders learn to adjust their bids closer to the 
cut-off that separates winning and losing bids. 
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The emerging trend toward the sale of emission 
allowances as a major method, or even the pri-
mary method, for allocating allowances into the 
economy has focused attention on the implica-
tions of various methods for selling allowances.
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1 The shift toward selling allowances and away from the past practice 
of allocating them for free to emitters has considerable consequences  
This is especially true given the considerable eco-
nomic value of the new environmental assets. The 
U.S. Congressional Budget Office estimates that 
the aggregate value of allowances under a na-
tional greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program 
would be between $50 billion and $300 billion 
per year (in 2007 dollars) by 2020. While there 
have been some experiments with other forms of 
sale, economic theory, the weight of recent ex-
perience, and current policy proposals lead us to 
expect that auctions will emerge as an important 
mechanism for selling allowances. It is widely 
accepted that the performance of different types 
of auction mechanisms will vary with the institu-
tional context. Taken together, these factors argue 
strongly for the importance of investigating the 
performance of different auction designs in the 
context of an allowance trading program. 
  This study is motivated by the observation that 
all of the major implementations of cap-and-trade 
regulations for the control of air pollution have 
started with a generous allocation of allowances 
relative to recent emissions history. At least at the 
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outset, the supply of allowances has been plenti-
ful relative to the number of allowances needed 
for compliance. In some cases the supply has re-
mained plentiful, while in others the supply has 
become progressively tighter. We use the term 
“loose cap” to refer to cases where the supply of 
emission allowances is relatively high, that is, 
relatively close to the unconstrained market equi-
librium. This might be relevant in absolute terms, 
if the emissions constraint does not bind at least 
for a short period of time, but more generally a 
loose cap is a relative concept. We investigate the 
performance of alternative types of auctions when 
the cap is loose and the expected auction price is 
low. 
  The relative slackness of an emissions cap 
could have implications for the preferred design 
of an allowance auction. Smith (1967) found that, 
in an experimental setting where bidders in a 
sealed-bid auction shared a common, but imper-
fectly known, value for multiple units of a good, a 
loose cap produced a divergence in the perform-
ance of different auction types. Specifically, Smith 
found that uniform-price auctions generated more 
revenue than discriminatory-price auctions when 
excess demand was low, but that uniform and 
discriminatory auctions generated comparable lev-
els of revenue when excess demand was high. 
  In this paper, we investigate the effects of a 
loose cap environment on a variety of auction 
types. We compare single-round, sealed-bid auc-
tions, both discriminatory and uniform price, with 
the multi-round, ascending-price, English clock 
auction. In single-round, sealed-bid auctions, bid-
ders submit a demand schedule for blocks of al-
lowances so that bids have both price and quan-
tity dimensions. In multi-round auctions, bidders 
submit quantities at a given price. If demand ex-
ceeds supply, the price is raised (like the advanc-
ing of a clock) until demand is equal to supply. 
We investigate the performance of the English 
clock auction both with and without excess de-
mand information provided to bidders between 
rounds. 
  We find that whether the cap is tight or slack, 
all auction formats studied are nearly 100 percent 
efficient in allocating emission allowances, with 
no systematic differences among them—e.g., al-
lowances are distributed initially in the auction to 
those who value them most. As we would expect 
in the less competitive environment of a loose 
cap, the amount of revenue raised in the auction 
appears to be less, relative to a competitive (Wal-
rasian) prediction determined by the supply and 
demand for permits, than revenue under a tight 
cap for all auction types. In terms of revenue gen-
eration, differences between auction formats are 
relatively minor. However, one notable effect of 
the auction design is that aggressive bidding in 
discriminatory auctions yields higher revenue 
early in a series of auctions, a pattern that tends to 
diminish later as bidders learn more about the 
likely level of the highest rejected bid. 
 
Background and Literature 
 
Several cap-and-trade programs for controlling 
air emissions have been characterized by loose 
caps, particularly during their early years of op-
eration (Ellerman et al. 2000). More generally, 
research by Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson 
(2000) suggests that environmental regulations 
often end up being less costly than was antici-
pated at the time of their adoption and that over-
estimation of baseline emission levels and failure 
to take account of the emission-reducing effects 
of technological change are important factors that 
contribute to that overestimation. 
  Probably the most famous case of a loose cap is 
Phase I of the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS). This program was implemented 
prior to the availability of an accurate inventory 
of CO2 emissions in the EU. Once it became clear 
that the number of allowances allocated was more 
than needed for compliance, the price of EU ETS 
allowances crashed. The fall was exacerbated by 
the limited lifespan of Phase I allowances, which 
were not bankable into Phase II. One auction of 
CO2 allowances under Phase I closed at a price of 
0.7 euros per ton of CO2, a fraction of the price 
just weeks earlier (Ellerman and Buchner 2007). 
  The first incentive-based program to be imple-
mented anywhere in the world on a large scale 
was the phase-down of lead in gasoline in the 
United States in the mid-1980s. The regulations 
permitted trading and banking of lead permits 
through inter-refinery averaging of the lead con-
tent of a gallon of gasoline. The standard started 
at 1.1 grams of lead per gallon in 1982, was low-
ered to 0.5 in 1985, and finally was reduced to 
0.1 in 1986 (Kerr and Newell 2003). 
  In California, the Regional Clean Air Incentives 
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NOx in the Los Angeles Basin began in 1994. 
Under this program, regulated facilities were free 
to pick their baseline emissions level from a time 
period of strong economic activity, and as a result 
the aggregate emissions cap was not binding dur-
ing the early years of the program (Burtraw et al. 
2005). The Emissions Reduction Market System 
for volatile organic materials in Chicago has been 
persistently slack, with emissions falling far 
below the cap between 2001 and 2005 (Evans and 
Kruger 2007). A number of factors have contrib-
uted to the slackness of the Emissions Reduction 
Market System, including inflated baseline emis-
sions, closure of regulated facilities, and inter-
actions with regulations directed at other air pol-
lutants. 
  The U.S. sulfur dioxide emissions trading pro-
gram initiated in 1995 was specifically designed 
to be relatively slack at first, with a significant 
tightening of the cap in a second phase. Changes 
in technology, fuel markets, and regulations of 
the railroads contributed to a decline in compli-
ance cost by the first year of implementation that 
was not anticipated when the program was en-
acted in 1990 (Burtraw 2000, Carlson et al. 
2000). Only after trading started in 1993 in ad-
vance of implementation did it become clear just 
how slack the initial cap was. An annual revenue-
neutral auction that was first held in advance of 
the compliance period played an important role in 
the discovery of compliance costs and the associ-
ated allowance price that ultimately obtained in 
the market. Low prices, thin trading, and large 
amounts of allowance banking characterized the 
early market for SO2 allowances (Ellerman et al. 
2000). 
  In January of 2009, ten northeastern states from 
Maryland to Maine launched the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative (RGGI), the second manda-
tory emissions cap-and-trade program for green-
house gas emissions in the world and the first in 
the United States. For the years 2009 through 
2014, the RGGI program caps total annual CO2 
emissions from electricity generators in the region 
at a level approximately 4 percent above the aver-
age annual CO2 emission levels in the years 2000–
2004. Beginning in 2015, the cap will decline 
about 2.5 percent per year for four years, until it 
is 10 percent below the initial cap by 2019. In 
addition to allowing full trading of allowances, 
the program provides flexibility by allowing for 
3-year compliance periods, with the first period 
extending from 2009 through 2011, full allow-
ance banking into future compliance periods, and 
limited use of emission offsets. 
 The  RGGI cap on carbon emissions was set 
with the idea that it would be “loose” in the early 
years of the program, so as not to stifle economic 
growth or cause shortages in the electricity mar-
ket. However, as the first CO2 cap-and-trade pro-
gram in the United States, the RGGI program is 
subject to much uncertainty. One of the many 
sources of uncertainty is the stringency of the an-
nual CO2 emissions cap compared to actual emis-
sion levels in the absence of a cap. Several recent 
analyses (Environment Northeast 2008, New Car-
bon Finance 2007, Point Carbon Research 2007) 
have compared the trend in CO2 emission levels 
and projected emission levels from electricity 
generators in the region to the level of the emis-
sions cap. The evidence suggests that, at the out-
set of the program, projected annual emissions 
could fall short of the initial annual RGGI emis-
sions cap of 188 million tons. 
  Even before the 2008–2009 recession, predic-
tions suggested that the RGGI caps might not be 
binding in the initial years of the program. Predic-
tions of slack demand were based on the growth 
in natural gas fired generation in the region,
2 
resulting both from greater use of natural gas in 
dual-fueled boilers that can burn both oil and 
natural gas and, importantly, the increase in new, 
highly efficient, natural gas fired capacity in the 
region. The relative costs of different fossil fuels 
helps determine the demand for emission allow-
ances through their effect on the dispatch of dif-
ferent types of generators in the electricity sector. 
For example, in 2004 a spike in natural gas prices 
led to greater use of coal to produce electricity, 
which contributed along with the introduction of 
the Clean Air Interstate Rule to a marked increase 
in SO2 allowance prices (Burtraw et al. 2005). 
Two years later, total emissions of SO2 from regu-
lated generators fell by over 800,000 tons relative 
to emissions in 2005. Nearly 30 percent of that 
reduction (or approximately 3 percent of the total 
annual supply of allowances) was attributable to 
the substitution of natural gas (which emits no 
SO2) for oil (which does) at dual-fueled generat-
ing units in response to increases in the relative 
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price of fuel oil (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency 2007). An increase in demand for CO2 
emission allowances of similar magnitude could 
result if a major nuclear plant in the region were 
to unexpectedly go offline for a period of time. 
  Another factor that will influence demand for 
emission allowances is the level of overall de-
mand for energy. If a cap-and-trade program is 
coupled with programs to enhance energy effi-
ciency, as envisioned in the CO2 programs in 
RGGI and in California (California Air Resources 
Board 2008), the level of demand for allowances 
will depend importantly on the effectiveness of 
those energy efficiency programs and policies. In 
RGGI, the memorandum of understanding among 
the ten participating states specifies that at least 
25 percent of the value of emission allowances 
must be directed toward strategic energy invest-
ments such as renewables and energy efficiency, 
and most of the states plan to use at least this 
portion of the RGGI allowance auction revenue to 
fund energy efficiency programs. Simulation 
modeling suggests that increasing the share of 
emissions-allowance revenue dedicated to fund-
ing efficiency programs could reduce RGGI al-
lowance prices by as much as 9 percent relative to 
a baseline of only 25 percent of RGGI revenue 
being dedicated to energy efficiency (Ruth et al. 
2008). 
  In the case of RGGI, there are factors that will 
help to mitigate the type of allowance-price col-
lapse that happened in the European Union al-
lowance market at the end of the first commit-
ment period. First, there is a reserve price in the 
RGGI allowance auctions of $1.86 per ton, which 
means that the RGGI states will sell no allowances 
in the auction at a price below $1.86. Second, and 
unlike Phase I of the EU ETS, the RGGI program 
allows full banking of allowances and the possi-
bility of purchasing allowances at a low price 
today and saving them for use when economic 
growth leads to greater electricity demand. In 
fact, in the first four RGGI auctions, all of which 
occurred during a serious recession, allowance 
prices closed well above the reserve price of 
$1.86, at $3.07, $3.38, $3.51, and 3.23, respec-
tively.
3 Even as demand faltered and prices fell 
                                                                                    
3 For the auctions from March 2009 forward, an auction was also held 
for a later vintage of allowance, which cannot be used prior to 2012. 
These allowances sold for lower prices, reflecting their lower “con-
venience value.” 
due to low utility emissions during 2009, the re-
serve price was never binding. The ability to bank 
allowances into future, post-recession years helps 
keep the price of allowances above the reserve 
price even in years of relatively slack demand. 
  The relevance of this slack demand to auction 
design arises from a developing expectation that, 
in the future, most cap-and-trade programs, and in 
particular those for controlling CO2 emissions, 
will provide for the auction of a significant share 
of allowances. Unlike what has occurred in pre-
vious emission cap-and-trade programs, the states 
participating in the RGGI program are, collec-
tively, planning to auction roughly 90 percent of 
the emission allowances created by the program. 
 The  RGGI states decided to expand the role for 
auctions, in part because they recognized that 
giving allowances away for free would not pre-
vent electricity producers in the region from 
folding the value of emission allowances into 
their bids in the power market. The region has 
moved almost entirely away from cost-of-service 
pricing to market-based pricing in electricity mar-
kets, which means that the opportunity costs of 
emission allowances would be passed on in elec-
tricity prices even if allowances were received for 
free by the regulated firms. 
  In contrast, most prior emissions trading pro-
grams, including the SO2 and NOx trading pro-
grams in the United States and the first two 
phases of the European Union’s Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme, began by granting the emission al-
lowances to current emitters for free. Recent regu-
latory and legislative proposals indicate that the 
RGGI cap-and-trade program presages a trend of 
increasing reliance on auctions for allowance al-
location. For example, current proposals in the 
EU provide for selling a substantial majority of 
the allowances used by electricity generators in 
the third phase of its program beginning in 2013. 
At the time of this writing all major proposals for 
a U.S. federal greenhouse gas cap-and-trade pro-
gram envision a significant role for auctions, al-
though some prominent proposals provide, at 
least initially, for a split between auctions and free 
allocation. 
  As allowance auctions become more prevalent, 
their performance under different market settings 
takes on increasing importance. Given the possi-
bility of low excess demand especially at the out-
set of allowance markets, the choice of auction 166    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
design should include consideration of the impact 




In the RGGI program, emission allowances are 
distinguished by the first date at which they can 
be used for compliance, and they can be used at 
any time after that. Allowances with the same 
vintage are identical, and therefore auctions for 
emission permits are multi-unit auctions. In the 
experiment, the term “permit” is analogous to al-
lowances in RGGI, each bidder is assigned several 
units of production capacity, and each unit of pro-
duction from a particular type of capacity unit 
requires some number of emission permits, which 
varies among participants to reflect a distribution 
of combustion technologies. Bidders’ values for 
permits are determined by the profit margins on 
their production capacity and by the number of 
allowances needed to cover the production activity. 
  The auction formats that we consider are distin-
guished in two dimensions: by whether or not 
there are multiple rounds of bidding, and by 
whether or not all bidders purchase permits at the 
same “uniform” price. In the single-round auc-
tions, bidders submit sealed bids for blocks of 
permits, and it is possible to make different bids 
for each block. These bids are then ranked from 
high to low as a pseudo demand function, and 
then the vertical supply of permits being auc-
tioned determines which bids are accepted. In a 
“discriminatory price” auction, successful bidders 
pay their own bid prices, whereas in a single-
round “uniform-price” auction, all pay the same 
market-clearing price, which is set at the highest 
rejected bid. In both formats, bids are required to 
exceed a pre-announced reserve price. The third 
format we consider is a multi-round “clock auc-
tion” in which bidders state how many blocks 
they wish to purchase at an announced price, and 
in which in each round the price is raised 
sequentially, as if by hands of a clock. The clock 
price begins at the reserve price and stops rising 
when aggregate bidder quantity demanded is less 
than or equal to the auction quantity supplied. In 
each round, bidders can reduce their quantity as 
the price rises, or leave demand unchanged, but 
they cannot increase the quantity of their bid 
according to the auction “activity rules” that force 
bidders to participate actively from the beginning. 
To maintain comparability with the other auction 
formats, prices with the clock are incremented by 
the same fixed increment that corresponded to 
possible bid increments in the single-round for-
mats. The experiments implemented two versions 
of the clock: one in which bidders were not told 
the aggregate demand quantity after each round, 
and one in which they were provided with this 
information.
4 
  Burtraw et al. (2009) report an experiment with 
these auction formats under treatment conditions 
that were designed to facilitate tacit or explicit 
collusion, e.g., the presence of a chat room or the 
existence of a secondary market where trades can 
be arranged to adjust for failure to obtain allow-
ances in a collusive phase. In all of the auctions 
reported in that paper, however, the cap on emis-
sions was tight in the sense that the available sup-
ply of permits in each auction was only about 
two-thirds of what would be demanded at a price 
of zero. In this paper, we report two series of auc-
tions: a baseline series where supply is two-thirds 
of the quantity that would be demanded at a zero 
price, and a loose cap series with a cap that repre-
sents about 90 percent of the quantity that would 
be demanded at a zero price. 
  In a loose cap environment, most bids will end 
up being accepted, and the resulting reduction in 
competition can serve as a useful “stress test” of 
auction formats. In a uniform-price auction, there 
may even be a role for the exercise of unilateral 
market power if the cap is so loose that a single 
bidder can profit from bidding lower on allow-
ances for marginally profitable capacity units in 
the hopes of lowering the clearing price on a large 
number of other, more profitable units. This strat-
egy is referred to in the literature as “demand 
reduction.” In a clock auction with low excess 
demand to begin with, a small amount of demand 
reduction by one or more bidders will stop the 
clock at low prices. Similarly, there is less risk to 
bidding low on marginal units in a multi-unit dis-
criminatory auction with a loose cap since a 
higher proportion of bids will be accepted, and 
the resulting bid reductions may cause revenue to 
be lower than in uniform-price auctions. This 
revenue comparison might be reversed if there is 
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did not provide excess demand information (Porter et al. 2009), and the 
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demand-withholding in uniform-price or clock 
auctions. 
 The experimental design implemented an 
asymmetry motivated by the difference between 
high emitters (e.g., those using coal) and low 
emitters (those using natural gas). Each labora-
tory auction involved 6 bidders, with 3 “high us-
ers” requiring 2 permits per unit of production 
capacity used, and 3 “low users” who were re-
quired to remit 1 permit per unit of production 
capacity used. All bidders were given 5 units of 
capacity, regardless of whether they were low or 
high users, reflecting the approximate equal pro-
portions of electricity production by each type of 
producer. Thus, low users would demand 15 per-
mits (= 3×5×1) and high users would demand 30 
permits (= 3×5×2), for a total demand of 45 per-
mits at a price of zero. For the loose cap treat-
ment, 40 permits were sold in each auction, and 
for the tight cap treatment, 30 permits were sold 
in each auction. Each unit of capacity could be 
used to produce a unit of a product that sold for a 
known price. Since permits could not be banked 
in this experiment, their values were determined 
by the difference between the product price and 
the production cost, divided by the number of 
permits required. Bidders received randomly de-
termined production costs associated with each 
unit of capacity; these costs were draws from uni-
form distributions—[2, 6] for high users, and [5, 
10] for low users—with new draws made for each 
successive auction. The permit values resulting 
from a given set of cost draws can be arrayed 
from high to low like a demand curve, as shown 
in Figure 1, where the auction supply is repre-
sented as a vertical line at the supply of 40 per-
mits (loose cap). 
  In Figure 1, the intersection of the value array 
and the auction supply determines a Walrasian 
price, which will vary from one auction to the 
next depending on the actual cost draws. Labo-
ratory sessions involved 6 bidders who partici-
pated in a series of 8 auctions over the course of 
an hour (including the reading of instructions). 
Both loose and tight cap treatments involved uni-
form, discriminatory, and clock auction formats. 
In addition, the loose cap treatment included a 
clock auction with full information about excess 
demand at the end of each round of bidding. Each 
combination of auction format and cap (loose or 
tight) involved 6 experimental sessions, each with 
6 bidders. The random cost draws were balanced 
across treatments, by using a given random num-
ber “seed” for the first session of each auction 
type, a second random number seed for the sec-
ond session of each auction type, etc. There were 
252 subjects who participated in the study. All 
were students at the University of Virginia, and 
were paid their earnings in cash at the end of each 
session. Participants received a $6 initial pay-
ment, and earnings in the auctions ranged from 
$15 to $45 after being converted (at a rate of 30 
cents per experiment dollar). The auctions were 
run using a web-based program that is publicly 
available on the Auctions Menu of the Veconlab 
site.
5 
  For each auction, we determined the maximum 
economic surplus that could be achieved given 
the fixed product price, the individual cost draws, 
and the number of permits being auctioned. This 
surplus is the area below the value array and to 
the left of the auction supply. In an actual auction, 
variations in bidding behavior may cause some 
permits to be purchased by bidders with low val-
ues, and the actual efficiency is determined by 
dividing the value of the resulting allocation by 
the maximum possible value. A second measure 
of auction performance is the amount of revenue 
that it raises. If all bidders bid their full values in 
a discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auction, the seller 
would receive the maximum revenue amount, 
which is the area below demand and to the left of 
the auction quantity, i.e., the entire economic sur-
plus. We will use a more realistic benchmark for 
revenue: the amount of money that would be 
raised if all permits sold at the market-clearing 
“Walrasian” price determined by the intersection 
of the supply and demand curves as depicted in 




Figure 2 shows the average prices for each of the 
8 auctions with a tight cap. Each solid line corre-
sponds to a different auction format, and the 
dashed line shows the Walrasian price predic-
tions. All prices represent averages across the 6 
sessions. All these prices are close to the Walra-
sian prediction, and there is no obvious trend in 
price levels. The small price differences do not 
result in significant differences in auction reve-
nues as determined by a Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
                                                                                    









Figure 2. Average Price Paid per Permit: Tight Cap 
 
test using revenue averages for each session.
6 To 
summarize, differences in auction formats do not 
                                                                                    
6 Using data from the final four auctions, the p-values for pairwise 
comparisons between auction formats are all greater than 0.10. 
have much impact on revenues in the competitive, 
tight cap environment. 
  Figure 3 shows the average price for each of 
the auction formats in the loose cap environment. 





Figure 3. Average Price Paid per Permit:  Loose Cap 
 
 
ing pattern in which the discriminatory auction 
yields higher average prices especially in early 
auctions, but this difference appears to taper off 
by the end of the series. Using data from the first 
four auctions in each session, the discriminatory 
format raises significantly more revenue than the 
other three formats.
7 In the last four auctions, the 
only significant difference is that the discrimina-
tory auction raises more revenue than the clock 
auction with full information (W= 0, p= 0.031). 
There is no difference between the revenues raised 
under the two types of clock auctions in either 
case (W= 6, p= 0.438, for the first four auctions, 
and W= 5, p= 0.313, for the last four auctions). 
  Table 1 summarizes the results for tests of dif-
ferences between auction types within a given 
“cap tightness” regime. Given the null hypothesis 
of no differences between auctions under a given 
regime, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for 
any auction comparisons under the tight cap. That 
is, evidence does not suggest a difference be-
tween auction types under a tight cap. Under the 
loose cap, only the comparison of discriminatory 
sealed-bid to the full-information clock gives a 
                                                                                    
7 In the first four auctions, the signed rank test statistic comparing the 
discriminatory-price auction to each of the other auction formats con-
sidered yielded a test statistic of 0 and a p-value of 0.031 in each case. 
Table 1. Differences in Auction Revenues 
Within a Regime 
Regime 
Test of H0 that auction types raise the same 
revenue (last 4 observations) 
Tight  Cannot reject H0 for any pairwise comparison of 
auction types. 
Loose  Discriminatory auction raises more revenue than 
the full-information clock auction (reject H0 with 




statistically significant difference; we reject the 
null hypothesis with p= 0.031, and conclude that 
discriminatory auctions raise more revenue than 
the full-information clock. 
  Some interesting properties of the sealed-bid 
auctions are revealed by an analysis of individual 
bid data and the way that bid patterns evolve over 
time. Figure 4 shows the bid data for the six uni-
form-price sessions. Bid values are on the vertical 
axis, and permit values are on the horizontal axis. 
Individual bids are shown for the first four auc-
tions (left) and the last four auctions (right). Lar-
ger data points represent higher frequencies of 
that bid/value combination. If bidders are bidding 

































Figure 4. Uniform Auction Individual Bids 
 
 
along the 45 degree line through the origin. In 
both panels, there is a clear density of bids along 
the 45 degree line, showing that in uniform-price 
auctions, many bidders bid their true values. Also 
notable is the instance of many bids above the 45 
degree line, particularly in the mid-value range, 
where bids are less likely to be marginal. There 
are few differences between the early and late bid 
distributions, indicating that bidding behavior is 
fairly consistent throughout the experimental ses-
sions. In the final half, however, there is a slight 
increase in the density of bids at value, and a 
slight decline in bids at the reserve price for these 
uniform-price auctions. 
  Figure 5 shows the bid data for the six dis-
criminatory sessions for both the first four auc-
tions (left) and the last four auctions (right). It is 
clear from comparing these figures with the com-
parable panels in Figure (4) that bidders imple-
ment different strategies in the two different auc-
tion formats. In the discriminatory auctions, there 
are far fewer bids on the 45 degree line, and the 
bids are more uniformly distributed between $2 
and $3, the typical clearing price. In discrimina-
tory, pay-as-bid auctions, bidders attempt to bid 
just above the market-clearing price for their 
higher-valued units in order to maximize the 
amount of surplus that they capture. The differ-
ences in bidding strategy between the two auction 
formats may account for the dynamic trend that 
we see in the loose cap data, where the discrimi-
natory auction has higher average prices than the 
other auction types initially, but where over time 
the prices drop with successive auction rounds. It 
may take several auctions for bidders to “dis-
cover” the clearing price and bring down the av-
erage price paid per permit. This can be seen by 
comparing the bid scatter graph for the first 4 
auctions with that of the final 4 auctions, as 
shown in Figure 5. In the early auctions, bids are 
more widely distributed between the reserve price 
and the bidders’ values, but in the later sessions, 
as bidders learn more about the likely cut-off 
price, the bids tend to be more clustered in the 
$2–$3 range. 
  Figure 6 depicts the proportion of the Walra-
sian revenue that was raised in the final four auc-
tions of each session, with sessions grouped by 
auction format and tight cap versus loose cap en-
vironment. Similarly, the bars in Figure 7 show 
the efficiency proportions for the final four auc-
tions in each session in both the loose cap and 
tight cap settings. Each bar represents a session, 
where the first session listed in each group was 
done with the first random number seed, etc. 
There are no clear differences among treatments 
or auction formats in terms of efficiency, with all 
values close to 100 percent. In contrast, revenue 
percentages all appear well below the Walrasian 
benchmark of 1, which was the expected result 
given the non-competitive nature of the experi-
mental setting.
8 For the pooled data across auc-
tion types, the two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum 
test (W= 265 and p= 0.031) allows us to reject, 
with better than 95 percent confidence, the null 
hypothesis that revenues are the same under a 
                                                                                    
8 In a series of experiments that we ran under more competitive con-
ditions with 12 bidders and a tighter cap (equal to 70 percent of de-
mand for permits at a zero price), we found revenues to be very close 
to Walrasian levels for uniform, discriminatory, and clock auction for-
mats, with no systematic differences across auction types (Holt et al. 






































Figure 6. Auction Revenue as a Proportion of Walrasian Revenue 
 
loose cap as under a tight cap. As expected, a 
tight cap results in more revenues than a loose 
cap. 
  This effect is not consistent across auction 
types. Using the Wilcoxon rank sum test for dif-
ferences in the proportion of Walrasian revenue 
raised between the tight and loose cap within 
each auction format, differences arise. Each ses-
sion was an observation where the proportion of 
Walrasian revenue averaged across the last 4 auc-
tions served as the measure for comparison. We 
are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no dif-
ference in the proportion of Walrasian revenue 
raised between the tight and loose cap environ-
ment for the discriminatory (W= 38, p= 0.937) 
and clock (W= 34, p= 0.485) auctions. However, 
we found that the uniform-price auction raised a 









tight cap environment relative to the loose cap 
environment (W= 24, p= 0.015). The results are 
summarized in Table 2. 
  It is well understood that a bidder in a uniform-
price auction may have incentive to shade bids on 
marginal units in an effort to lower the clearing 
price on the bidder’s infra-marginal bids. This de-
pends on the bidder’s assessment of the prob-
ability that a reduction in a bid will lower the 
clearing price and by how much. The gain from 
such a reduction would depend on the number of 
 
Table 2. Differences in Auction Performance 
Between Loose and Tight Caps 
Auction Type  Result 
Pooled data  Revenues greater with tight 
cap (p=0.031) 
Discriminatory sealed-bid  No significant difference 
Uniform sealed-bid  Revenues greater under tight 
cap (p=0.015) 
Clock  No significant difference 
winning bids (with bids close to the expected 
closing price) that the bidder will have—the more 
the accepted bids, the greater will be the value of 
any price reduction resulting from shading bids 
on marginal units. Earlier studies that have inves-
tigated the exercise of market power explicitly 
controlled market power and made the extent of 
this power known to subjects by providing de-
tailed information about the market structure. In 
our experiments, the extent of market power de-
pends on random elements and is difficult for the 
bidders to evaluate. 
  If the bidders were acting on a correct assess-
ment of their market power, then we would ex-
pect that any such bid shading would be posi-
tively associated with the size of the expected 
price movement and the expected number of win-
ning bids. It seems reasonable to expect, then, 
that we would see bids falling further below their 
actual value for those allowances close to the 
closing price, and that users needing more allow-
ances would tend to shade more than those need-
ing fewer allowances. 
  Figure 8 shows the bid-to-value ratios broken 





Figure 8. Bid-to-Value Ratios for Uniform Price Auction 
 
 
by tightness regime and by users with high and 
low need for allowances in production. It is con-
sistent with the demand reduction hypothesis that, 
in each value range, the average bid-to-value ratio 
is lower with a loose cap than with a tight cap. 
This is true for both low users and high users. 
However, under the demand reduction hypothesis 
just described, we might also expect to see greater 
bid reductions for allowances with values in the 
$3 to $4 range, since these are the marginally 
profitable allowances, and this effect should be 
greater for users needing high numbers of allow-
ances than for those needing low numbers of al-
lowances because there are more infra-marginal 
units on which to benefit from a reduced price. 
This second expectation about bid shading is not 
evident in Figure 8. There does not appear to be a 
significantly greater difference in bid-to-value ra-
tios in the $3 to $4 range than in other value 
ranges. Exploring the bidding behaviors that lead 
to the lower prices for uniform-price auctions un-
der a loose cap would seem to be a fruitful area 
for future research. 
  The results reported here contrast with those 
reported in Smith (1967). Smith found that seller 
revenues were higher in a uniform-price auction 
than in discriminatory auctions in settings with 
moderate numbers of rejected bids, and that this 
difference is not apparent with high numbers of 
rejected bids. While these were multi-unit auc-
tions, they are not directly comparable to our re-
sults since bidders were allowed to submit only 
two bids; our design allowed bidders to submit 
any number of bids for blocks of allowances. 
Moreover, in Smith’s experiments, about a third 
(8 of 26) of the bids would be rejected even in the 
treatment with the fewest number of rejected 
bids—a considerably more competitive environ-
ment than the “loose cap” treatment tested in our 
experiments. As we have already argued, our less 
competitive set-up is more consistent with what 
has been observed in the early stages of emission 
trading regimes “in the wild.” Furthermore, the 
Smith experiment was done in an environment 
that was motivated by the Treasury bill auctions, 
in which the prize values to bidders were identi-
cal for all units and were randomly determined, 
i.e., a random common value. The experiments 174    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
reported in this paper implement a private value 
setting to emphasize the private nature of infor-




The initial allocation of emission allowances in a 
cap-and-trade program is one of the most conten-
tious issues surrounding this form of environ-
mental regulation. Increasingly, policymakers are 
turning to the sale of emission allowances as the 
desired approach for distributing some or all of 
the allowances created by a cap-and-trade pro-
gram, and to auctions as the best approach for 
structuring that initial sale. Given the substantial 
value of emission allowances associated with fu-
ture cap-and-trade programs, particularly those de-
signed to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, 
finding the most efficient auction method and a 
way to capture the full market value of that newly 
created public asset is of keen interest to govern-
ment officials. In addition, federal legislation to 
establish cap-and-trade programs for CO2 in the 
United States and the current proposal for phase 
III of the EU ETS envision using a portion of the 
revenue from an allowance auction to promote 
carbon-free technologies and energy efficiency in 
an effort to ease the transition to a world with 
lower CO2 emissions. In order to be able to fund 
these efforts to the greatest extent possible, poli-
cymakers are keenly interested in having an auc-
tion design that will lessen opportunities for col-
lusion and allow allowances to be sold at their 
full market value. 
  Past research suggests that the amount of reve-
nue raised in different auction formats could de-
pend on the amount of excess demand in the al-
lowance market; and, given the prominence of 
relatively loose caps in the early years of past and 
existing cap-and-trade programs, it is important to 
test the efficacy of different auction types. We 
use laboratory experiments to test the perform-
ance of four auction types in the presence of a 
loose cap, including uniform single-round, dis-
criminatory single-round, clock, and clock with 
excess demand information. 
  We find that, with a loose cap, all of the auc-
tion formats investigated yield a nearly 100 per-
cent efficient allocation of permits. As expected, 
for all auction types the amount of revenue raised 
in the auction appears to be less than revenue 
raised with a tight cap. Given a loose cap, auction 
type does affect revenues. Discriminatory auc-
tions yielded higher revenues than sealed-bid uni-
form-price or the clock auction designs. How-
ever, the differences among the different auction 
types eroded over time during a particular auction 
session. The convergence of results is consistent 
with learning and price discovery affecting the 
bids of participants in discriminatory auctions. 
Bidders in discriminatory-price auctions appear to 
be more successful in later rounds at pegging 
their bids to the expected market price. This sug-
gests that the advantage of the discriminatory-
price auction would likely not persist in a regime 
of regular greenhouse gas auctions. 
  Our experiments did not include an opportunity 
to bank allowances for use in future periods. The 
opportunity to bank allowances would support the 
price of allowances and attenuate the impact of 
the loose cap. The extent to which banking would 
alter the performance of auctions under a loose 
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